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ABSTRACT 
Red Sea, White Tides, and Blue Horizons 
by 
John Devine 
Advisor: James Oakes 
Eric Hobsbawm, in his effort to explain the fundamental divide which produced the Second 
World War, convincingly argues that “the crucial lines in this civil war were not drawn between 
capitalism as such and communist social revolution, but between ideological families: on the one 
hand the descendants of the eighteenth-century Enlightenment and the great revolutions 
including, obviously the Russian revolution’, on the other hand, its opponents.” This thesis 
argues that the American Civil War was a “great revolution” that represented a crucial 
transformative point in the formation of these two waring factions. The struggle was especially 
influential on the theory of Karl Marx, who declared in the preface to the First German Edition to 
Capital Volume I, that “As in the 18th century, the American war of independence sounded the 
tocsin for the European middle class, so that in the 19th century, the American Civil War sounded 
it for the European working class.” The death of slavery in the United States was not a 
inevitability, but the result of intense political struggle that emerged from a foundational material 
contradiction of North American settler colonialism and subsequent capitalist development 
which dramatically reshaped the transnational ideological dialectic between the forces for and 
against the rule of the masses. 
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Red Sea, White Tides, and Blue Horizons  
 In 1918, as the imperial powers of Europe smashed their apparatuses of mass violence 
against each other, the continent’s newest statesman composed a love letter to the American 
working class. Echoing the language of the most famous text written by the historical materialist 
philosopher who most influenced his political practice, the Chairman of the Council of People's 
Commissars declared that “America has taken first place among the free and educated nations in 
the level of development of the productive forces of collective human endeavour, in the 
utilisation of machinery and of all the wonders of modern engineering.” In particular he praised 
the “American people, who set the world an example in waging a revolutionary war against 
feudal slavery” and ridiculed all those who would deny “the immense, world-historic, 
progressive and revolutionary significance of the American Civil War of 1863-65!” Vladimir 
Ilyich Ulyanov urged the American proletariat to revive the spirit of their rebellious past and 
transform the imperialist world war into a civil war against the bourgeoisie.1  
 Lenin was not the only Bolshevik leader to draw ideological inspiration from the struggle 
between the Union and the Confederacy. In his reply to Karl Kautsky’s critique of war 
communism, Leon Trostky justified the terroristic methods utilized by the Red Army against the 
Russian White Guard by drawing a comparison to the federal government’s decision during the 
American Civil War to imprison citizens of Baltimore at Fort McHenry in violation of Habeas 
Corpus. He described how dissenting opinions were suppressed with revolutionary fervor 
throughout the Union, where “people frequently burst into the offices of newspapers which 
supported the revolting slave-owners and smashed their printing presses.” With the abolition of 
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property in human beings at stake, “the institutions of democracy proved absolutely powerless to 
decide the argument in a peaceful way.”2  
The social transformation unleashed by the American Civil War was unquestionably 
revolutionary. A struggle that emerged from a partisan dispute over the productive mode of 
imperial expansion into the Western territories, ended with the eradication of chattel slavery from 
the United States. C. Vann Woodward has suggested that “the end of slavery in the South can be 
described as the death of a society, though elsewhere it could more easily be characterized as the 
liquidation of an investment.”3 Yet, contrary to false narratives propagated in the aftermath of 
Recontruction, the peculiar institution of the Southern social system was not experiencing a 
natural demise in the years leading up to the violent struggle between the Union and the 
Confederacy. In reality, property ownership in human beings and their exchange value on 
commodity markets had reached their zenith. In 1805 there were just over one million slaves in 
the United States valued around $300 million; fifty-five years later the American planter class 
possessed the largest slave empire in the world where four million human beings in bondage 
were worth approximately $3 billion.4  
Their accumulated capital dramatically vanished as the slave masters’ most productive 
investment consciously liquidated themselves as a class in response to the outbreak of total war. 
As WEB Du Bois convincingly argues in Black Reconstruction in America, the withholding of 
labor by hundreds of thousands of enslaved people “was not merely the desire to stop work. It 
was a strike on a wide basis against the conditions of work. It was a general strike that involved 
directly in the end perhaps half a million people. They wanted to stop the economy of the 
plantation system, and to do that they left the plantations.”5 Not only did the rebelling slaves 
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momentarily disrupt the agricultural production that enriched their owners and provided 
sustenance for Confederate soldiers, they directly waged war against the civilization that had 
locked them in chains in a deliberate effort to permanently break them. By 1865 their asset value 
had been unwillingly exchanged into an armed revolutionary force as tens of thousands of 
formerly enslaved people joined the Union Army to overthrow their old masters. As President 
Lincoln observed, "without the military help of the black freedmen, the war against the south 
could not have been won."6 Thus the end of slavery was more than a passive expiration of the 
American South’s peculiar institution, but the active destruction of the slave masters’ regime by 
their class enemies through a revolutionary struggle that spurred the birth of a new society.  
After exerting outsized influence over national politics for the first seven decades of the 
American republic, the slavocracy committed accidental class suicide in their effort to prevent 
their collective suffocation by the ascendent free labor political coalition. Prominent Southern 
families had held a dominating presence in all three branches of the federal government since its 
founding, but the election of the antislavery Republican Abraham Lincoln to the presidency 
shattered their faith in the Union to protect their peculiar form of private property. After years of 
Northern politicians acquiescing to the Slave Power, a political coalition committed to the 
principles of free labor consolidated within the newly formed Republican Party. Its prominent 
leaders promised to put slavery on a “course of ultimate extinction.”7 In an attempt to preserve 
the foundational social relations of their society, the Southern ruling class launched a preemptive 
political counterrevolution against the state apparatus that had for several decades not merely 
enabled the continuation of property ownership in human beings, but expanded its domain by 
waging settler colonial wars of aggression against both the various indigenous nations of North 
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America and the Mexican Empire. While their aggressive strategy has been typically 
characterized by historians as an hysterical overreaction to electoral defeat, James Oakes notes 
that the secessionists were merely taking the “Republicans at their word.”8 
 In the decade leading up to the war, free labor ideologues castigated slave masters as 
“barbarians” who “prated of freedom for the sake of establishing and perpetuating slavery; who 
boasted of liberty that they might exercise despotism.”9 At that same time defenders of property 
ownership in human beings decried that wage labor was actually “more cruel” than slavery and a 
veiled disguise of what in reality was really just a “White Slave Trade.”10 Eric Foner asserts that 
in the same way in which “freedom and slavery were joined in the actual development of the 
New World, the definition of free labor depended on juxtaposition with its ideological opposite, 
slave labor.”11 United in their pursuit of capital accumulation, the political economies of slavery 
and freedom split over the labor regime best suited for the appropriation of surplus-value and the 
concomitant progressive development of civilization. With the election of Abraham Lincoln to 
the White House, the material and ideological contradiction at the core of the early American 
republic burst into a violent class struggle that permanently altered the trajectory of world 
history. Hundreds of thousands died in the total war unleashed by the slave masters’ reaction to 
the threat posed to their peculiar means of capital accumulation by the ascendency of a free labor 
politician to the highest seat of power in the United States.  
 Less than four years after his inauguration, slavery was abolished by an official decree of 
the Congress and ratified by the states before the end of that year.12 Alongside the Republican 
Party and the Union army, newly freed men and women liquidated the Southern slavocracy that 
had dominated the federal government since its founding. In his letter to Abraham Lincoln on 
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behalf of the International Workingmen’s Association, Karl Marx declared that “your re-election 
is Death to Slavery” and rejoiced that “this barrier to progress has been swept off by the red sea 
of civil war.”13 There is no doubt that the greatest emancipation of labor during Marx’s lifetime 
heavily influenced his understanding of the dialectic between capitalist development and violent 
class struggle. Yet the impact that the abolition of chattel slavery in the United States had on 
Marxian theory and practice is largely absent from prominent narratives on the European 
idealogical civil war unleashed by the First World War. Even the most acclaimed historical 
materialist literature on the transformation of human civilization since the dual revolutions of the 
late eighteenth century overlooks how the nineteenth century war in which enslaved black 
Americans broke their own chains shaped the ideological struggles that defined the twentieth 
century. 
In The Age of Empire, the conclusion to his renowned trilogy on the long-nineteenth 
century, Eric Hobsbawm demonstrates how the First World War shattered the foundations of 
European society. “What collapsed was clear: the liberal world system and nineteenth-century 
bourgeois society as the norm to which, as it were, any kind of 'civilization' aspired.”14 
Hobsbawm is certainly correct in his assessment that as millions of men marched to their doom 
in the summer of 1914 European society began to descend into an industrialized barbarism that 
would permanently revolutionize its power structures. Over the next three decades the horrors of 
mechanized warfare ravaged Europe in a series of civil and imperialist wars. In Russia, such 
unprecedented violence strained the autocracy beyond its breaking point as it proved increasingly 
incapable of effectively mobilizing its imperial subjects for mass human sacrifice on the front 
lines. The Czarist state’s legitimacy disintegrated. More than a decade later in his reflection upon 
!6
the crisis unleashed in Russia by the First World War in which he would ultimately play a central 
role, revolutionary leader Leon Trotsky described how “Tracts of land were violently laid waste. 
Clouds of human locusts were driven to the rear with whips. The external rout was completed 
with an internal one.”15 On March 8th, 1917 strikes and bread riots broke out in Petrograd. 
Industrial workers and starving civilians took to the streets. Four days later the local garrison 
mutinied and overthrew the dynasty that had ruled over Russia for three centuries.16 The 
liquidation of the Romanov regime failed to pacify the insurrection that had precipitated its 
collapse, but rather catalyzed both an intensification and proliferation of revolutionary fervor 
across the decomposing remains of the Russian Empire.  
The new Provisional Government proved incapable of establishing hegemony as its 
sovereignty was immediately contested in the trenches, countryside, and cities by class warfare 
and the soviet organizational form. Military discipline fractured as rank and file soldiers 
organized councils and abandoned the front in droves. Class hierarchy melted in the countryside 
as peasants set fire to the property of the landed gentry. War production stalled as overworked, 
starving industrial workers increasingly seized control of the factories. The masses demanded 
peace, land, and bread. While the Provisional Government was deaf to their ultimatum, the 
Bolsheviks heard their collective call. Lenin seized the opportunity to put his revolutionary 
theory into practice amidst the rebellion of  “unprecedentedly large masses of proletarians who 
have just awakened to political life.”17 He justified launching the socialist revolution in Russia 
out of his analysis that it was the “weakest link” in the imperialist chain.18 The Bolsheviks 
gambled that the proletarian seizure of power in Russia would transform the World War into an 
international civil war against the various national ruling classes. At first it appeared as if the 
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workers of the world were uniting into a collective force for global revolution. Popular uprisings 
against the imperialist war spread westward across the European continent. As the Bolsheviks 
consolidated their power in Petrograd, it “was to Germany that [Lenin] looked most anxiously.”19 
This was due to the fact that their more advanced capitalist economy represented a far better fit 
for the Marxist theory of proletarian revolution. Between 1871 and 1910 industrial production 
had increased fivefold in Germany, a process that transformed their economy into the most 
powerful force in continental Europe.20 During that same period the proportion of people living 
within cities had risen from 36.1 percent to 60 percent.21 Meanwhile in Russia, four-fifths of the 
self-supporting population of Russia was still engaged in agricultural work on the eve of the 
revolution.22 
 By the fall of 1918, hundreds of thousands of German soldiers retreated from the endless 
graveyards of the Western Front.23 German sailors joined in the revolt against their imperial 
government. The Second Reich crumbled and unleashed a struggle for power. The decision of 
the German Social Democratic Party to support the war effort four years prior created divisions 
amongst the organized forces of the left that proved impossible to heal. Revolutionary 
communists, led by Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht, rose up to seize power in Berlin in 
January of 1919. Their insurrection rapidly collapsed as they lacked support from many of their 
former allies in the SDP. The government of Ebert and Scheidemann stood out of way as the 
Freikorps extinguished the rebellion. Luxemburg and Liebknecht were assassinated amidst the 
struggle. Their murders “rendered unbridgeable the gulf between the Majority Social Democrats 
and the revolutionaries.”24 Communists momentarily seized power in other cities across the 
continent over the next few years, but they never managed to subordinate the propertied classes 
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to a socialist state anywhere outside of Russia. Ultimately, as Hobsbawm describes, “The world 
revolution, which justified Lenin’s decision to commit Russia to socialism, did not take place, 
and with it Soviet Russia was committed to a generation of impoverished and backward 
isolation.”25 
Revolution inevitably spurred counterrevolution. Unsurprisingly, the landed gentry and 
their allies refused to be sacrificed at the altar of egalitarian progress and human liberation. 
Financed by the foreign imperial powers, the remnants of the old regime organized into various 
White armies in their effort to return their class to state power. Millions perished in the Russian 
Civil War as famine and the competing reigns of terror ravaged the country. Tens of thousands of 
Jews were slaughtered by the Whites in Ukraine during a wave of pogroms in 1919. Admiral 
Kolchak, who led the counterrevolutionary campaign in Siberia, declared his intention “to 
exterminate and annihilate” Bolshevism. The Bolsheviks responded in kind as the Cheka, their 
new secret police, executed tens of thousands throughout the war.26 In a radio address directed 
towards an American audience less than two decades later during the 1930s, Leon Trotsky argued 
that the “high costs of the revolution” were justified in the same manner that “the progressive 
forces of American society” rationalized the mass violence required to defeat the master class.27 
Civil war inevitably produced an unfortunate but unavoidable reality in which the struggle to 
overcome the forces of reaction necessitated regrettable sacrifices of human life. Within five 
years of the Bolshevik seizure of state power the counterrevolution had been crushed by the Red 
Army and purged from the Soviet Union. The peasantry overcame their suspicion of socialism to 
ultimately side with the Bolsheviks, who promised to redistribute the land, over the aristocrats, 
who viewed them as inherently inferior. Their contingent allegiance to the newly constructed 
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socialist state proved decisive. The revolution survived. Through the 600,000-strong centralized 
and disciplined Communist Party, the Bolsheviks constructed a new state.28 However, as Arno 
Mayer notes, “the counterrevolution took root abroad. It developed and came of age throughout 
Europe in the form of Fascism.”29  
Hobsbawm asserts that the “rise of the radical Right after the First World War was 
undoubtedly a response to the danger, indeed to the reality, of social revolution and working-
class power in general, to the October Revolution and Leninism in particular.”30 Fascist leaders 
did not deny that the basis of their ideology was rooted in taking action against revolution. A 
decade following his seizure of power during the March on Rome, Mussolini wrote that 
“Fascism [is] the complete opposite of…Marxian Socialism.”31 While the various struggles of 
the twentieth century European civil war as well as the particularities of the revolutionary and 
counterrevolutionary ideological formations that emerged in that continental slaughterhouse are 
well beyond the scope of this essay, its end result is familiar to most with a basic understanding 
of modern history. Nazi Germany launched an unprecedented war of annihilation in a 
counterrevolutionary crusade to exterminate Bolshevism. Six million Jews were slaughtered by 
the death cult arm of private property while somewhere around eleven million Red Army soldiers 
as well as between seven and twenty million of the Soviet civilian population died in the struggle 
against Nazi imperial aggression.32 Yet less than two decades into the thousand year Reich, the 
Fuhrer’s utopian dream mutated into his worst nightmare. Hitler stabbed himself in the back as 
the Red Army overwhelmed the depleted Nazi forces in Berlin. While the triumph of their will 
proved short lived, the ascendency of the genocidal Nazi Empire has shaken the collective 
consciousness of those who value human life ever since.  
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Civilizational collapse did not materialize out of thin air, but violently burst through the 
cross-class alliances that had consolidated their rule amidst the ‘Springtime of the Peoples.’ 
Crucially, as Hobsbawm states in The Age of Capital, the bourgeoisie ceased to be a politically 
revolutionary force in the European imperial core in the aftermath of the 1848 revolutions.33 
Unlike the American slave owners, the European aristocracy prevented their liquidation in the 
nineteenth century through class compromise. The specter of social revolution pushed the 
capitalist class to export their “uninterrupted disturbance of all social conditions” to the 
colonized periphery as they constructed a new form of hegemonic rule in a historic bloc with the 
ancien regime.34 As Arno Mayer describes, “Postfeudal nobilities and landed elites generally 
survived into the twentieth century not simply or primarily because of their privileged political, 
social, and cultural positions but also because of their still massive, if slowly decreasing, 
economic weight.”35 Even as the German Empire blazed a path towards industrialization and 
urbanization in the first decade of the twentieth century nearly half of the population still lived in 
villages and towns of less than 10,000. 20 percent of national income continued to be produced 
by the 40 percent of German laborers who remained in agriculture.36 The uneasy, but 
strategically necessary relationship between the bourgeoisie and the aristocracy combined with 
the materialization of a social Darwinian global imperium to foster even more ideological 
bloodlust, especially as war presented an opportunity for the old regime to reaffirm its 
supposedly inherent superiority. Even though capitalist market dependence increasingly seized 
power over all the propertied classes, the bourgeoisie had not actually emerged as hegemonically 
dominant in all of Europe as the continent’s competing national ruling classes soaked their 
civilization in blood.  
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Yet to even attempt to fully explore what produced the killing fields of Europe in the 
twentieth century requires escaping the confines of the continent itself. The manner in which the 
Civil War in the United States is largely absent from narrative explanations of the violent end to 
the Belle Époque is emblematic of how even anticapitalist intellectuals reinforce the national 
borders created by the social system they hope to see overthrown. While Hobsbawm accurately 
recognized imperial competition as the fundamental cause of the First World War, even he and 
other historians from the imperial core who were sympathetic to the plight of colonized people 
were blind to the extent of European barbarity waged against them. As Mike Davis articulates, 
“modern historians writing about nineteenth-century world history from a metropolitan vantage-
point have ignored the late Victorian mega-droughts and famines that engulfed what we now call 
the ‘third world.’ Eric Hobsbawm, for example, makes no allusion in his famous trilogy on 
nineteenth-century history to the worst famines in perhaps 500 years in India and China.”37  
Such devastating famines existed under conditions in which the imperial elite had the 
power to prevent mass death, but the masters of the market refused to provide relief to a 
population they regarded as inferior. Feeding the starving peasants would have been a rejection 
of the ‘natural law’ of ‘survival of the fittest,’ a heretical violation of their social Darwinian 
principles. Instead British viceroys permitted huge grain exports to flow to the imperial 
metropole as the local population was reduced to skin and bones. Mass starvation was only made 
possible by the new social structures that emerged as the British imperial state increasingly 
penetrated the Indian countryside in their hunt for new sources of raw materials. The American 
Civil War had disrupted the flow of slave cultivated cotton into English textile factories. As Karl 
Marx noted, as a “consequence of the great demand for cotton after 1861, the production of 
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cotton, in some thickly populated districts of India, was extended at the expense of rice 
cultivation.”38 Less than two years after the secession of the Confederacy, raw cotton production 
in India increased by 50 percent as the colony momentarily became their primary supplier. In 
Berar, the total acreage for cotton harvesting nearly doubled between 1861 and 1871. British 
imperial policy liquidated the village based governing structures and forced market dependence 
onto the locals.39 What spurred the unprecedented mass slaughter on the European continent 
beginning in 1914 were the violent processes through which the ‘liberal world system’ originally 
emerged.  
Hobsbawm by no means neglects the significance of the American Civil War in his 
brilliant narrative on the rise of bourgeois global hegemony. In The Age of Capital, the British 
Marxist asserts that the conflict was the “greatest of all wars” in the period between the European 
revolutions of 1848 and the Great Depression of the 1870s, while also articulating its disruptive 
impact on international commodity markets.40 He certainly recognizes the central role that the 
war between the Union and the Confederacy had in the ascendancy of the American capitalist 
class. According to Hobsbawm, not only did the American Civil War result in “the triumph of the 
industrialized North over the agrarian South,” but additionally “might be regarded as an early if 
giant step on the road which was in the twentieth century to turn all the Americas from a British 
to an American economic dependency.”41 Yet what is underemphasized by Hobsbawm is not the 
crucial role that the American Civil War had in revolutionizing “the relations of production,” but 
rather how the political struggle that produced the violent liquidation of the American slavocracy 
and the emancipation of its most valuable asset altered the ideological development of 
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oppositional movements committed to either transforming or preserving the “whole relations of 
society.”42  
Eric Hobsbawm experienced these violent contradictions firsthand as a teenager in the 
streets of Berlin, as the Jewish communist fought alongside his German Bolshevik comrades 
against Nazi brownshirts. Later in his life, in his effort to explain the fundamental divide which 
produced the Second World War, Hobsbawm convincingly argues that “the crucial lines in this 
civil war were not drawn between capitalism as such and communist social revolution, but 
between ideological families: on the one hand the descendants of the eighteenth-century 
Enlightenment and the great revolutions including, obviously the Russian revolution’, on the 
other hand, its opponents.”43 His theoretical proposition is far more grounded in historical reality 
than liberal historians such as Mark Mozower who primarily blame the horrors of the Age of 
Catastrophe on the attempt of utopian ideologues “to remake society, the continent and the world 
in a New Order for mankind.”44 Such narratives oversimplify the causes of mass death in Europe 
by downplaying the continental powers’ exportation of unrelenting violence to their colonies in 
the decades prior, while overlooking the conflicting philosophical ideals’ roots in the 
fundamental social contradictions of the Belle Epoch. With his own evidence Mazower 
contradicts his argument that utopianism was the primary catalyst that unleashed Europe’s dark 
twentieth century. He describes how “German anthropologists who shaped SS racial policy in 
eastern Europe during the Second World War had begun their careers with scholarly articles on 
‘race mixing’ in pre-1914 colonial Africa and Asia, where their concerns were shared by British 
and French colleagues.”45 While manmade ideologies absolutely shape the course of historical 
development, philosophers do not possess the power to change the world in the circumstances of 
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their own design. Rather, material reality and belief systems smash against one another in a cycle 
that perpetually reshapes both in an unpredictable trajectory.   
While Hobsbawm correctly identifies the central contradiction that produced the warring 
factions of the European ideological civil war, there is still a missing piece within his epic 
narrative. The class war waged against the Slave Power in the United States is entirely absent 
from the chapter in The Age of Capital dedicated to the emergence of Marxism, despite the fact 
that Marx wrote extensively on the American Civil War. In the preface to the First German 
Edition to Capital Volume I, Karl Marx declared that “As in the 18th century, the American war 
of independence sounded the tocsin for the European middle class, so that in the 19th century, 
the American Civil War sounded it for the European working class.”46 Additionally, he referred 
to the struggle between the Union and the Confederacy as “the one great event of contemporary 
history.”47 The American Civil War was not only demonstrably one of “the great revolutions” 
that Hobsbawm referenced, but the struggle between the Union and the Confederacy represented 
a crucial transformative point in the emergence of these warring “ideological families.”  
The Confederate ruling class’ rationalization of secession fully elucidates what particular 
aspects of the great revolutions have produced this violent schism. While Alexander Stephens 
feared the consequences of a potential war abolitionism, he gradually embraced disunion through 
his belief that the central role that chattel slavery played in the international circulation of 
commodities would ensure security for the master class. “In olden times the olive branch was 
considered the emblem of peace; we will send to the nations of the earth another and far more 
potential emblem of the same, the cotton plant.”48 In an appeal to the British government in 1861 
R.M.T Hunter, the Confederate Secretary of State, argued that secession established “no 
!15
precedent for the overthrow of the lawful authority of a regular Government by revolutionary 
violence” but rather was sovereign states acting in coordination to “preserve their old 
institutions.”49 Southern newspapers decried that the Republicans were “active and bristling with 
terrible designs and as ready for blood and forcible realities as ever characterized the ideas of the 
French revolution.”50 The forces of reaction have not opposed the unprecedented accumulation 
of wealth and technological development spurred by capitalist production, nor have they 
inherently rejected Smithian notions of the free market. What has been untenable for the 
unenlightened faction of the ruling class and their sycophants have been the efforts to materialize 
the egalitarian ideals of the great revolutions. The Confederate political project was an 
antidemocratic counterrevolution against any perceived threat to the chattel slave mode of 
production. In his Second Inaugural Address, Confederate President Jefferson Davis clearly laid 
out the slavocracy’s justification for secession: “To save ourselves from a revolution which, in its 
silent but rapid progress, was about to place us under the despotism of numbers.”51 President 
Lincoln offered a diametrically opposed theory of who has the right to rule. In the Gettysburg 
Address, he declared “that government of the people, by the people, for the people, shall not 
perish from the earth.”52 The death of slavery in the United States was not a inevitability, but the 
result of intense political struggle that emerged from a foundational material contradiction of 
North American settler colonialism and subsequent capitalist development which dramatically 
reshaped the transnational ideological dialectic between the forces for and against the rule of the 
masses. 
The violent political antagonism that exploded into the bloodiest conflict in the history of 
the United States did not materialize out of purely idealistic differences between the Southern 
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states and the rest of the American republic. Since the first decades of English settlement in 
North America, colonialists in what would later become the Union and the Confederacy 
constructed distinct land and labor regimes in reaction to the social transformation in their 
motherland. Proletarianization, the process through which the agricultural producing class 
became dependent on selling their labor to the owners of private property to survive that 
ultimately developed into mass production in factories, first occurred in the English countryside 
as an unintended consequence to the crisis of feudalism. As their tenants attempted to exert 
customary rights and take advantage of competition between lords, English elites utilized their 
preeminent class institution, the monarchical state, to legally strip peasants of access to their land 
and violently crush any uprisings against the emerging social order. Consequently the mass of 
agricultural producers were forced to increase productivity in order to maintain any semblance of 
their former way of life.53 The intelligentsia of the ascendant bourgeoisie celebrated their 
society’s exceptional productivity by naturalizing these historically unique social relations as 
inevitable byproducts of the sacred laws of human development. However, as Karl Marx noted, 
“spoliation of the church’s property, the fraudulent alienation of the State domains, the robbery 
of the common lands, the usurpation of feudal and clan property” had been erased from their 
narrative. A history of violence had been washed away by the new religion of progress.  
The dispossession of the English peasantry was not the only “reckless terrorism” required 
for the rising global dictatorship of capital accumulation.54 Empire was the means through which 
the English ruling class transformed land and labor regimes around the world for their own 
benefit. New England settlers attempted to escape the worst consequence of proletarianization by 
fleeing across the Atlantic Ocean to not commodified territory but ultimately spread the domain 
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of market dependent social relations to North America. The colonizers purposely developed a 
political economy rooted in widespread land ownership. Local town governments managed 
prices, wages, and migration in an effort to stave off the overwhelming pauperization that had 
disturbed the moral senses of the Puritans in England. As Barry Levy summarizes, “New 
England’s male workers exercised more political power and enjoyed more equality than almost 
any other producers in the Atlantic World.”55 Colonization in Virginia and the Carolinas followed 
a different course from the onset. The settlers hoped to replicate the immense and concentrated 
wealth of the British gentry. However, there was no mass of landless wage laborers to exploit in 
North America as in England. As imported indentured servants proved difficult to control, 
racialized slave labor kidnapped from Africa filled the void.56  
As the particular trajectories of economic development in North America generated 
lucrative means for commodity production and capital accumulation, the imperial state in 
London constructed a legal regime to meet the demands of the metropole’s financial profiteers.  
Representatives of the British propertied classes fostered market dependent social relations on 
their North American colonial subjects in the eighteenth century. In response to Virginia planters 
resisting the demands of English creditors, Parliament decreed the Act for the More Easy 
Recovery of Debts in his Majesty's Plantations and Colonies in America in 1732. All forms of 
property were obtainable for debt collectors. Claire Priest describes how not only did this 
imperial policy “diminish the role of landed inheritance in American society by privileging the 
claims of creditors over heirs when debtors died” but that it “promoted the slave trade by 
explicitly repealing all colonial property exemptions to land, houses, and slaves and by requiring 
colonial courts to administer streamlined processes for seizing and selling these assets.”57While 
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some state legislatures placed limitations on debt collectors in the aftermath of the American 
Revolution, slaves remained legally defined as seizable assets.   
Contradictorily, as the various former colonies were integrated into the newly established 
American national state following the War of Independence, the gulf between their political 
economies broadened exponentially. As slave labor was gradually abolished in the Northern 
states, property ownership in human beings proliferated across the South. The expansion of the 
master class’ plantation empire was the direct consequence of what Eric Hobsbawm describes as 
“probably the most important event in world history.”58 By the nineteenth century this new set of 
market dependent social relations had utterly revolutionized a historically agricultural 
civilization into an urban society. In 1750 approximately 8 percent of the population lived in the 
countryside, by 1850 nearly half of the English people lived in cities. During the first half of the 
nineteenth century the population of London nearly tripled from 960,000 to 2,685,000.59 A new 
class emerged, the industrial bourgeoisie, who increasingly accumulated capital as their wage 
laborers utilized machines to transform raw materials into marketable goods on a mass scale. As 
factory workers replaced the individualist workshop guild as the dominant form of the division 
of labor in manufacturing it ushered in an era of historically unprecedented economic growth. 
Pig iron production in England rose from an annual average of just 69 thousand metric tonnes 
per year in the 1780s to approximately 3.5 million metric tonnes per year by the end of the 
1850s, while the output of coal and lignite grew from approximately 17.7 million metric tonnes 
in 1822 to 158.9 million metric tonnes in 1882.60  
The Industrial Revolution in England increased production in its textile factories on an 
unprecedented scale which in turn spurred gluttonous demand for raw cotton, as imports into the 
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workshop of the world grew from 11 million pounds in 1785 to 588 million pounds by 1850.61  
American slave plantations seized the lucrative opportunity to become their primary supplier. 
The growth of their export oriented industry was dramatic. Cotton production soared from 1.5 
million pounds in 1790 to 2.28 billions pounds on the eve of the American Civil War.62 As the 
British industrialists revolutionized the instruments of production, American slave owners spread 
their relations of production westward across the North American continent. Yet this circulation 
of exchange did more than merely extend the sphere of chattel slavery, it utterly metamorphosed 
the basis of its existence. Karl Marx noted that as the American master class cultivated raw 
materials for the British industrial bourgeoisie it furthered the commodification of labor power 
on both sides of the Atlantic. As “the cotton industry introduced child-slavery in England, it gave 
in the United States a stimulus to the transformation of the earlier, more or less patriarchal 
slavery, into a system of commercial exploitation. In fact, the veiled slavery of the wage workers 
in Europe needed, for its pedestal, slavery pure and simple in the new world.”63 Unlike Lenin, 
Marx did not characterize nineteenth century American chattel slavery as feudal, but rather 
formulated that the ancient practice of appropriating surplus-value through slave labor had been 
revolutionized by the increasing dependence of the master class on the market. In order to 
preserve their status as property owners, slave owners needed to continually accumulate more 
capital. Even though the United States had achieved political independence, the Southern states 
became increasingly economically dependent on the emerging factory system in England as 
commodified plantation labor cultivated raw materials for mass production overseas. Thus this 
most important world historical development was rooted in the mutually profitable exchange 
between the British bourgeoisie and American slave masters.  
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Industrialization was not the only dramatic social transformation of the late eighteenth 
century that was shaped by the emerging American republic and in turn altered the new nation's 
political economic trajectory. The United States was born during a period of unprecedented 
upheaval all across the Atlantic World, now commonly referred to as the Age of Revolution. 
Popular revolt in the European metropole and their colonies exposed the weaknesses of the old 
regimes. Imperial war pushed the French monarchical state to its breaking point as its support of 
the American War of Independence, in an effort to undermine its English rival, led to bankruptcy. 
The parameters of global political struggle were permanently altered by the active destruction of 
what had been Europe’s most powerful ancien regime. Like their American counterparts, French 
revolutionary leaders drew ideological inspiration from the Enlightenment. However, Hobsbawm 
argues that the transformation they presided over “was far more fundamental” and “its 
consequences were therefore far more profound.” The most dramatic result of the American War 
of Independence was the negation of “the political control of the British,” while the struggle in 
France was “a mass social revolution” whose ideals reverberated around the world.64 Arno 
Mayer goes even further to suggest that the American Revolution “was actually a restoration” 
primarily “driven by tradition.” In contrast to the French revolutionaries who produced “a 
decisive change in the very meaning of the word-concept revolution” when they “abolished 
seignorial rights and feudal privileges and adopted the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the 
Citizen.”65 During the midst of the Civil War in the United States, Marx posited a different 
understand than Mayer’s later analysis on the role that the American Revolution had in bourgeois 
ideological development when he declared that “the American War of Independence initiated a 
new era of ascendancy for the middle class” in Europe.66 While Hobsbawm convincingly 
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demonstrates how the French Revolution represented a more radical transformation than the 
American Revolution, his assessment is more aligned with Marx in the sense that he argues that 
the revolt of the American colonists “helped to stimulate the French” revolutionaries and served 
as “inspiration for democratic-radical movements.”67 In particular, the similar ideals of the two 
revolutions’ most famous declarations provides strong evidence of a shared political lineage 
between the two struggles. Yet, Mayer’s hesitancy in drawing this connection is rooted in the 
reality that chattel slavery was not merely preserved in the aftermath of the War of Independence, 
but aggressively expanded until it was dramatically extinguished in the American Civil War.  
Another revolution during this era of unprecedented social transformation did bring about 
the destruction of property ownership in human beings. The first successful slave revolt in 
history not only shook the nerves of the master class and reshaped their ideological justification 
of chattel slavery, but reconfigured the economy of the Atlantic World. While this most dramatic 
and immediate global repercussion of the French Revolution is underemphasized in both 
Hobsbawm’s and Mayer’s narratives, the uprising in Haiti undeniably altered global capitalist 
development. In 1789 French Saint Domingue was the wealthiest colony in the Caribbean where 
452,000 slaves annually produced 177,000,000 pounds of sugar and 74,000,000 pounds of 
coffee, more than anywhere else in the world.68 This paradise of profits for the French maritime 
bourgeoisie was a hell on earth for its laborers. If they survived the charnel boats of the Atlantic 
passage, the slaves were often worked to death on the plantations. Torture was the response to 
the mildest transgression as “masters poured burning wax on their arms and hands and shoulders, 
emptied the boiling cane sugar over their heads, burned them alive, roasted them on slow fires, 
filled them with gunpowder and blew them up with a match.”69 The slave owners' reign of terror 
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was flipped on its head after the liquidation of the aristocratic monarchy in the imperial capital 
spurred an uprising in its most profitable colony. Jacobinism spread to Haiti as revolting slaves 
melted their own chains with fire and blood. After more than a decade of various revolutionary 
and imperial conflicts, the colony severed ties with France in 1803 after formerly enslaved black 
masses overcame Napoleon’s attempt to return them to bondage. As CLR James articulates, 
former slaves “had seen at last that without independence they could not maintain their liberty, 
and liberty was far more concrete for former slaves than the elusive forms of political democracy 
in France.”70 Out of both fear of another counterrevolutionary challenge to their liberation and a 
desire for revenge over decades of violent exploitation, the armed forces of the newly 
independent black republic massacred most of the remaining French whites.   
The first successful slave uprising in history provided a profound challenge to the United 
States’ leading slave owners’ commitment to bourgeois ideals of liberty. American federal policy 
towards Haiti gradually changed as the constitutional republic experienced its first partisan 
transfer of power in the executive branch. In the last year of the eighteenth century, President 
John Adams, a representative of the New England merchant class, signed legislation that 
established independent diplomatic relations with the Haitian leader Toussaint as well as 
legalized trade with the island, despite the embargo with France. The ascendency of the slave 
owning Thomas Jefferson to the presidency represented a profound shift in the United States’ 
relationship to Haiti, especially in the aftermath of its bloody struggle for independence.71 On 
February 28, 1806 Jefferson signed into law a bill that banned trade with the black republic and 
denied it diplomatic recognition. William Plumer, a Federalist Senator from New Hampshire, 
decried that “several of the Senators from the Southern States declared that almost the only 
!23
reason that reconciled them to the bill was the fatal influence that the independence of the 
Haytians would have on their own slaves."72 A new counterrevolutionary ideology had begun to 
emerge. In his famous writings on agriculture, John Taylor, the Democratic-Republican Senator 
from Virginia, proclaimed that “making republicans of negro slaves” ultimately produced an 
political crisis in which “one colour must perish.” His critique of equality went beyond the 
Haitian Revolution. While he sympathized with the “abstract principles” of the French 
Revolution, Taylor asserted that the attempt to implement them in practice “turned out to be a 
foolish and mischievous speculation.”73 Elizabeth Dillon and Michael Drexler argue that Taylor’s 
work represented a moment in which “slave owners shifted from apologetic defenses of slavery 
to aggressive ones that described slavery as a positive good.”74 Paranoia about a similar uprising 
in the American South combined with the unforeseen demand for slave cultivated cotton 
unleashed by the Industrial Revolution in England resulted in a reconfiguration of the dominant 
ideology of the master class.  
The specter of slave revolt was just one of many social questions faced by the ruling elite 
of the early American republic as they constructed their new state apparatus. Even though the 
various propertied classes of the newly established United States would increasingly split apart 
over the right to own human beings as chattel, the continuation of the settler colonial project 
provided a unifying force in the first decades of national development. The vanguard of the 
American Revolution did not abandon their former colonial overseers’ commitment to capital 
accumulation, but rather they viewed the territorial spread of modern private property as the 
political means through which to secure the perpetuation of their dominant position atop the 
social hierarchy in the so-called New World. Joshua Simon frames the American War of 
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Independence in the broader context of “anti-imperial imperialist” revolutions across the 
Americas. He argues that “Hamilton, Bolivar, and Alaman all converged on an important set of 
ideas, defending American independence as a response to the unequal conditions imposed on 
Creoles by European imperial rule, proposing, constitutions designed to protect Creole privileges 
within independent societies by unifying former colonies and granting executives extensive 
authority, and seeking to consolidate their states’ sovereignty through territorial expansion and 
internal colonization.”96 What made this ideological project more successful in the United States 
than the rest of the hemisphere was that the competing political factions were able to find enough 
common ground to facilitate peaceful transfers of state power in the first decades after the 
American Revolution. In the Federalist Papers, James Madison had offered a theoretical solution 
to the class violence of European society. “Extend the sphere” of the Union in order to prevent an 
“improper or wicked project” such as the “equal division of property” from descending the 
nation into civil war.75 Despite the significant differences between the parties that Hamilton and 
Madison represented, the distinct propertied classes in the United States built a cross-class 
alliance on the shared principle that imperialism would ensure social stability and provide the 
opportunity to generate more profit.  
More than twenty years after the ratification of the Constitution, former President 
Thomas Jefferson wrote to then President Madison to congratulate his administration on the 
resumption of trade with the English. He also noted how bright the prospects had become for 
American imperialism. He believed that “no constitution was ever before so well calculated as 
ours for extensive empire.”76 Only a few years before, during his own presidency, Jefferson had 
taken advantage of Napoleon’s failure to reestablish colonial domination over Haiti to cheaply 
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purchase France’s North American territory. While in reality much of the land was still controlled 
by the indigenous population, the Louisiana Purchase nearly doubled the territory available to 
American settlers for colonization. Madison’s political theory appeared to be delivering in 
practice. In an 1822 message to Congress, President Monroe reiterated the rhetoric of his 
predecessors. He declared that the “greater the expansion, the greater the advantage” for the 
United States.77 Earlier in Monroe’s presidency, General Andrew Jackson had taken an 
aggressive action that the Commander and Chief was unwilling to pursue, but happy to condone 
once it proved successful. The American occupation of Spanish Florida paved the way for its 
annexation by the United States. Secretary of State John Quincy Adams declared that “law of 
nature” made it “unavoidable that the remainder of the continent should ultimately be ours.”78 
The American founders’ ideological justification for territorial conquest proliferated well beyond 
the boundaries of North America. Five years before the onset of the twentieth-century, as the 
British imperial apparatus starved millions of peasants to death in their colonies, British 
millionaire Cecil Rhodes echoed a similar sentiment. He proposed that “colonial statesmen must 
acquire new lands to settle the surplus population, to provide new markets for the goods 
produced in the factories and mines. The Empire, as I have always said, is a bread and butter 
question. If you want to avoid civil war, you must become imperialists.”79 
 Material reality proved to be far more contradictory. Ultimately the various 
developments unleashed by the Age of Revolution did not resolve the fundamental contradiction 
of North American settler society, but further intensified the division over the foundational social 
question in the United States. Settler colonial conquest on the periphery unleashed political 
antagonism in the imperial core, specifically over whom would most benefit from the 
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expropriated plunder. Due to the electoral system of unequal representation inscribed into the 
Constitution, the Southern slavocracy held a firm grip on the United States federal government 
from the founding. They utilized the powers of the executive branch to seize land from the 
indigenous population in order to proliferate chattel slavery westward across the continent. As 
the American republic expanded westward and plantation owners weaponized the antidemocratic 
mechanisms of the Constitution to their advantage, representatives from the far more populous 
free states became increasingly antagonistic to the Slave Power. Iowa Congressman Josiah 
Grinnell observed in 1865 that in the last few decades before the Civil War slaveholders “have 
had the Secretaryship of State for two thirds of the time; and… . . for four fifths of the time have 
the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy been from the South.”80 The 7 percent of the 
Southern population that owned three-forths of the nearly four million slaves not only ruled over 
their plantations with a bloody whip, they exploited their grip over their local estates to seize 
control of the federal government. This minority of landed oligarchs utilized their entrenched 
power to determine “eleven out of sixteen Presidents, seventeen out of twenty-eight Judges of 
the Supreme Court, fourteen out of nineteen Attorneys-General, twenty-one out of thirty-three 
Speakers of the House, eighty out of one hundred thirty-four Foreign Ministers.”81 Yet their 
dominance over the political institutions of the United States concealed their society’s relative 
weakness compared to the rapidly industrializing states where slavery had been abolished. Karl 
Marx recognized how it had become an absolute necessity for the master class to exert their 
outsized influence on the federal government in order to further spread the reach of their social 
relations of production and maintain the legitimacy of the plantation regime. “Moreover, the 
oligarchy of the 300,000 slaveowners could not even maintain their sway at home save by 
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constantly throwing out to their white plebeians the bait of prospective conquests within and 
without the frontiers of the United States.”82 With their strong hold over the state apparatus, the 
Southern slavocracy pursued a program of vast imperial expansion in order to further germinate 
their social order across North America.  
 Foreshadowed by the general’s invasion of Florida a decade prior to his election to the 
presidency, the transition from the republic’s founding generation to the Jacksonian consensus 
represented the acceleration of the settler colonial project and the vulgarization of its ideological 
justification. During the 1830s, Democratic administrations ethnically cleansed the southeastern 
states of their indigenous population through the forced removal of 85,000 people. In the fifteen 
years prior to the election of Abraham Lincoln, the native population of California declined by 
more than 100,000.83 President Andrew Jackson believed the more gradual expansionist strategy 
of his predecessors was too accommodating to the native population. Their negotiating tactics 
were insufficient to meet the needs of the growing slave empire. In 1830 he signed into law the 
Indian Removal Act, which mandated that federal troops purge the lands east of the Mississippi 
of their indigenous peoples. He justified his imperial policy through the implicit language of 
white supremacy. “What good man would prefer a country covered with forests and ranged by a 
few thousand savages to our extensive Republic, studded with cities, towns, and prosperous 
farms embellished with all the improvements which art can devise or industry execute, occupied 
by more than 12,000,000 happy people, and filled with all the blessings of liberty, civilization 
and religion?”84 State sanctioned mass violence on the border was foundational to the ideological 
project of Jacksonian herren-volk democracy. In the antebellum United States, freedom was 
defined by the unlimited violence white Americans could perpetuate upon the racialized peoples 
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walled outside of the body politic. For Jackson, liberty meant the freedom for white settlers to 
clear any land of their former inhabitants in order to bring it under the plantation regime. 
Barbaric violence was the most effective means through which to spread the enlightened 
civilization of the master class. Whiteness was the new religion that provided a moral 
justification to his imperial crusade. War on the frontier brought new fertile lands under 
cultivation that produced a lucrative bounty for King Cotton but simultaneously unleashed the 
political crisis that ultimately liquidated his throne.  
The territorial annexation of Mexican land north of the Rio Grande heightened tension 
between the increasingly distinct regions of the United States political economy. During the 
1820s the Mexican imperial government, intent on suppressing indigenous revolt, encouraged 
American settlement in what would ultimately become the state of Texas. Anglo colonists 
brought with them a vision of enriching themselves through the spread of chattel slavery. 
Leading settler Stephen Austin declared that the “primary product that will elevate us from 
poverty is Cotton.” He believed that property ownership in human beings was a necessary 
precondition to produce that wealth.85 Conflicts over slavery spurred civil war in Mexico and 
lead to the secession of Texas from the empire. The struggle unleashed ripple effects that 
generated open antagonism in the halls of the United States government. When pursuing the 
annexation of Texas as Speaker of the House, James Polk faced the wrath of a free state 
congressman for his commitment to westward expansion on behalf of the slavocracy. Polk was 
demeaned as “the slave holder sitting in the chair” by John Quincy Adams, who had become 
increasingly disillusioned with the imperial project since his time in the Monroe administration 
as the prerogatives of a more brazen master class steered American foreign policy. The former 
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president accurately ridiculed Polk as a “slave-holding exterminator of Indians.”86 Yet his words 
were powerless to stop the relentless advance of the vast Southern empire. By the middle of the 
next decade Polk was elected president and pursued an ambitious imperial agenda that only 
further intensified sectional hatred in Washington. In a speech directed against President Polk’s 
foreign policy in the House of Representatives while the American military waged war on 
Mexico, Connecticut Congressman Gideon Welles declared “The time has come, when the 
Northern democracy should take a stand. Everything has taken a Southern shape and been 
controlled by Southern caprice for years.”87     
Less than a year prior to the ‘Springtime of the Peoples’ in Europe, soldiers in the United 
States army marched into the Plaza de Armas as the American flag arose above the Mexican 
capital. Despite the outsized role of the planter class in leading this imperial war of westward 
expansion, certain historians have asserted that the slave owners were a provincial ruling class 
primarily concerned with preserving traditional values through their local dominion. Eugene 
Genovese claims that they possessed “an aristocratic, antibourgeois spirit” that “recoiled at the 
notions that profit should be the goal of life.”88 He goes as far as to argue that the “planters, in 
truth, grew into the closest thing to feudal lords imaginable in a nineteenth-century bourgeois 
republic” while literal descendants of European feudal lords still maintained massive estates 
across the Atlantic.89 While Genovese is certainly correct in his assessment of the central role 
that the master-slave relationship played in determining the characteristics of Southern society, 
their social relations of production did not inherently reproduce the ideological culture of 
European aristocrats. As James Oakes demonstrates,“by the late eighteenth century the bourgeois 
critique of slavery had become something like the consensus among leading Americans.”90 
!30
Thomas Jefferson and James Madison, the preeminent intellectuals of the slaveholding class in 
the early American republic, embraced the principles of classical political economy put forth by 
their contemporaries Adam Smith and Benjamin Franklin who argued that slave labor was 
inefficient compared to wage labor. Contrary to false narratives propagated in the aftermath of 
the Civil War, the plantation owners were an imperially oriented, bourgeois educated ruling class 
concerned with capital accumulation and territorial expansion from the onset of the American 
republic who increasingly turned towards pseudo-scientific racism as the global cotton trade 
produced unprecedented wealth for their class. Through their growing dependence on the 
international circulation of commodities and the concomitant acceleration of the settler colonial 
project arose a new creed of white nationalist free market zealotry that served their material 
interests as well as provided the master class with a powerful ideological weapon on the 
emerging terrain of mass politics.  
Following the conquest of Mexico, South Carolinian politician William Gilmore Simms 
proclaimed that the war had secured “the perpetuation of slavery for the next thousand years.”91 
While Simms clearly lacked foresight, his optimistic mindset reflected the ambitions of a ruling 
class who oversaw decades of unprecedented national development. Between the ratification of 
the Constitution and the midpoint of the nineteenth century, Americans quadrupled the size of 
their country through the violent displacement of the native population. During this same period, 
the gross national product ballooned more than sevenfold, to a great extent on the lacerated backs 
of the enslaved black population.92 It has been estimated that the master class earned an average 
10 percent rate of return on investments in human bondage during this period.93 Slave owners 
moved their profitable assets to the lucrative opportunities in their newly conquered territory. 
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The population of enslaved persons working in states that had not been established at the 
founding of the American republic tripled between 1820 and 1840. On the eve of the Civil War, a 
majority of slaves, over two million, labored in these newer states whose plantations had become 
the predominant suppliers of British textile mills.94 Chattel slavery in the antebellum United 
States cultivated more than two-thirds of the the world’s cotton.95 Throughout the Western 
Hemisphere “the total value of trade in slave-produced goods nearly doubled between 1820 and 
1860.”96 Plantation produced commodities not only dominated the world market, the raw cotton 
helped fuel the textile factories that had launched the industrial revolution on both sides of the 
North Atlantic. Such developments only further entrenched the chattel slavery based social 
system in the American South and deepened the master class’ idealogical commitment to its 
preservation.  
The sprawling growth of the American experiment unleashed contradictions that would 
shatter the relations of production and political structure upon which the republic was originally 
founded. Verbal altercations in the halls of republican government were a reflection of the 
increasing divergence between the social relations of production of the South and the rest of the 
United States spurred by the dramatic rate of economic transformation. In the fifty years before 
the election of Abraham Lincoln to the presidency, industrial production skyrocketed more than 
fifteen fold.97 During those same five decades the percentage of the labor force engaged in non-
agricultural pursuits more than doubled, increasing from 21 to 45 percent. By 1860 the United 
States had built a larger network of railroads than the rest of the world combined, with 30,000 
total miles of track. Traditional notions of time and space were liquidated by this transportation 
revolution. The shipment time for freight between New York and Cincinnati was reduced by a 
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thousand percent, from fifty to five days of travel.98 Concurrent with this dramatic economic 
metamorphosis was the rapid growth of the American population, which expanded six times 
faster than the world average.99 Charles Post describes how in the aftermath of the American 
Revolution “federal land-policies radically altered the relationship of rural households to 
landholding, making the appropriation, maintenance and expansion of land dependent upon 
successful commodity-production.”100 Compelled by legally imposed market dependence, 
property owners were forced to compete amongst themselves to increase productivity if they 
wanted to maintain ownership of their property. These new state enforced social relations led to 
an age of unprecedented economic growth through a perpetual cycle of capital accumulation.   
However such development was geographically uneven. Due to its particular trajectory of 
colonial settlement, capitalist development in the states where slavery was abolished generated a 
political economy with a far more dynamic internal market that was not dependent upon British 
industrial production. While the plantation regime was clearly immensely profitable, the 
draconian labor system that produced its wealth was ill-suited for internal market development. 
Export oriented political economies have accumulated massive wealth for their local ruling 
classes throughout history, but their extractive nature and their reliance on hyper-exploitation has 
often generated resistance from the propertied classes to social investment as well as obstructed 
the emergence of a consumer market for the laboring classes. While the master class was heavily 
engaged in and dependent upon the capitalist world market, their primary asset was in slaves 
whose value was mainly determined by the price of cotton on the international commodity 
market. What was absent from the American South was the dynamic relationship between the 
city and the countryside that had emerged in the rest of the United States as the result of owner-
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operator farmers competing to maintain control of their means of production. As opposed to the 
semi-colonial relationship that developed in the Southern states as American slave masters 
supplied the British bourgeoisie with raw materials for mass production in English textile 
factories, a domestic system of industrial manufacturing emerged in the Northern states. The 
competing political factions that ultimately clashed in the struggle between the Union and the 
Confederacy emerged from this foundational material contradiction of settler colonialism and 
capitalist development in North America.  
The transition from a self-sufficient household economy to a market dependent society 
altered the very basis of social life. In New England, where these relations of production first 
materialized in North America, the size of families declined throughout the first half of the 
nineteenth century. Fertility rates declined as the male heads of households lost control over their 
familial labor force.101 Their cash crops fed the towns and cities as capitalist manufacturers 
within these growing urban centers simultaneously competed amongst themselves to efficiently 
produce tools that best suited the demands of the agricultural owner-operators. Those who lost 
control over their means of subsistence joined the swelling ranks of the American proletariat 
alongside the growing wave of European immigrants. This emerging set of social relations 
required new infrastructure to efficiently function. Massive networks of railroads developed to 
meet the demands of the petty bourgeois agriculturists and the newly established manufacturing 
centers as settlement expanded westward.102 The construction of canals was also crucial to the 
rapid expansion of economic activity in the United States during this period. Around 35,000 
workers built over 2,000 miles of canals during the 1830s. Brutal conditions on these 
construction sites where the laborers lived in “temporary settlement of ramshackle huts” 
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highlighted the ways in which the freedom of wage labor was a double edged sword for the 
working class that would only become more obvious in the aftermath of the Civil War.103  
While property owners were increasingly dependent on commodity markets for their 
social reproduction all across the United States, the predominance of petty-bourgeois farmers in 
the Ohio Valley and the Great Plains as well as the prevalence of both a rising industrial capitalist 
class and relatively highly paid wage laborers in Northern cities created vastly different 
economic incentives and political values than in the South. These emerging relations of 
production provided a powerful incentive to revolutionize the instruments of production. Of the 
143 significant inventions patented in the United States in the seven decades prior to the Civil 
War, more than 90 percent came from inventors located in the states where slavery had been 
abolished. The emerging factory system was predominantly based in New England.104 While 
Northern firms produced 222,577 tons of railroad iron, the South failed to produce even 30,000 
tons prior to the Civil War. Only one company existed in the South that built railroad engines, 
compared to nineteen such businesses in the North.105 During the first six decades of the 
nineteenth century the proportion of the Northern labor force in agriculture dropped by nearly 
half while the Southern proportion remained stable. According to the census, only 10 percent of 
Southerners lived in urban areas, contrasted with a quarter of the Northern population. Almost 
twice the percentage of Northern children attended school. Nearly half of the Southern residents 
were illiterate, a phenomenon that was becoming increasingly rare in the free states where only 6 
percent of people could not read.106 The agrarian basis of the Southern economy does not explain 
the lack of intellectual development in that region. Before 1850, “the rural North led the world in 
the building of schools, the hiring of teachers, and overall enrollments.”107 It was the social 
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property relations of chattel slavery, in which the laboring class was legally barred from literacy 
training, that stunted social progress.   
The growing disparity between the North and South made Yankees more openly 
antagonistic towards the peculiar institution of the planter class. In the 1840s, Whig leader and 
future Republican Secretary of State William Henry Seward decried that slavery produced “an 
exhausted soil, old and decaying towns, wretchedly neglected roads” that inevitably lead to “an 
absence of enterprise and improvement.”108 Former slave Frederick Douglass, in his 
autobiographical account of his experience in bondage that proved to be one of the most 
consequential liberatory texts of the antebellum United States, echoed similar sentiments. “From 
the wharves I strolled around and over the town, gazing with wonder and admiration at the 
splendid churches, beautiful dwellings, and finely cultivated gardens; evincing an amount of 
wealth, comfort, taste, and refinement, such as I had never seen in any part of slaveholding 
Maryland.”109 Narrative of the Life of Frederick Douglass simultaneously highlighted the violent 
brutality of chattel slavery while humanizing the racialized laborers whom that system branded 
as property. Douglass described the barbaric torture inherent to the plantation system in vivid 
detail. He had “often been awakened at the dawn of day by the most heartrending shrieks” of his 
aunt as the overseer whipped “her naked back till she was literally covered with blood.”110  
Perhaps the most powerful aspect of his life’s story for propagandistic purposes was the 
manner in which Douglass centered how chattel slavery led to the systematic breaking up of 
families. “My mother and I were separated when I was but an infant - before I knew her as my 
mother. It is a common custom in the part of Maryland from which I ran away, to part children 
from their mothers at a very early age.”111 Family separation was not merely a method through 
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which to discipline human chattel into submission on the local plantation, but a means of 
transforming people into exchange value on the market. In the last four decades prior to the Civil 
War, approximately 300,000 humans were sold between owners on the interstate slave market.112 
The commodification of enslaved Africans was fundamental to the planter class’ ability to secure 
investment for an expansion of production. Rather than land, private property in human beings 
was the means through which the master class accessed credit.113 Through their slave-based 
collateral arrangements with factors, local merchants who provided slave owners access to the 
international market, indebted masters were able to maintain their social status. This system of 
trading in human beings produced intense criticism from the antislavery political movement in 
the free states. Abolitionists propagated slave masters’ own words in some of their most effective 
condemnations of the institution. Theodore Weld simply reprinted advertisements like the 
following from a New Orleans newspaper: “NEGROES FOR SALE. - A negro woman 24 years 
of age, and two children, one eight and the other three years. Said negroes will be sold separately 
or together as desired.”114   
Yet the increasing popularity of Northern critiques of chattel slavery only further pushed 
the master class to redouble their commitment to the foundational social relations of their 
civilization. In the late 1830s William Harper published Memoir on Slavery, an ideological 
manifesto that justified human bondage through a repudiation of the Declaration of 
Independence in its opening pages. He argued that all men were not created equal. Instead 
Harper insisted that “the strong and wise should control the weak and the ignorant.”115 His ideas 
were a precursor to the emergence of social Darwinian rationalizations of inequality later in the 
century. In a similar justification of human bondage, American diplomat and ardent secessionist 
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William Trescot theorized that the regime of racial slavery prevented class conflict by 
constructing a system where “labour is dependent on capital, and having ceased to be rivals, they 
have ceased to be enemies.”116 He did not characterize the slaveholding class as traditionalists, 
but rather as a superior class of capitalists who had overcome the social question through their 
mastery of slaves. Their “command of the Gulf and the cotton trade” would secure their class’ 
role as “guardian of the world’s commerce.”117 While Trescot’s vehement separatism was not yet 
the dominant position in the South, political strife over the next decade would increasingly push 
the majority of the master class towards his point of view.  
Developments in the exchange value of their peculiar institution’s primary export 
commodity on the world market only served to further reinforce the slave owners’ belief in the 
glorious future of their vast Southern empire. During the 1850s the price of cotton more than 
doubled, which in turn increased production to four million bales annually by the end of the 
decade. It was also a boom time for the tobacco and sugar trade. In 1858, South Carolinian 
Senator James Hammond proclaimed that the “slaveholding South is now the controlling power 
of the world. Cotton, rice, tobacco and naval stores command the world… No power on earth 
dares… to make war on cotton. Cotton is king.”118 Considering the predominance of the Slave 
Power and its hegemonic ideology of white supremacist settler colonialism, many contemporary 
observers would have been shocked to discover that less than two decades after European 
workers stormed the barricades that the greatest emancipation of labor in their lifetimes would in 
fact occur in the United States. Greg Grandin argues that American wage workers faced similar 
social problems as their European counterparts during this period, but “instead of waging class 
war upward - on aristocrats and owners - they waged race war outward, on the frontier. ”119 
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While he is certainly correct that the settler colonialist project undermined working class 
solidarity in the nineteenth century, such a generalized assessment overlooks the emergence of 
proletarian organization across the United States during that same period. Steven Hahn describes 
how, as early as the mid-1830s, “citywide trade unions and federations had been established in 
urban centers large and small, east and west—in St. Louis, Cincinnati, Pittsburgh, Louisville, and 
Cleveland; in Buffalo, Albany, Troy, Newark, and New Brunswick; as well as in New York, 
Boston, and Baltimore—and union membership spiked to near 300,000, composing somewhere 
between one-fifth and one-third of all urban journeymen.”120 However, working class 
organizations in the antebellum United States lacked sufficient power to address their grievances 
at the national level and therefore were largely subordinate to the political prerogatives of the 
rich merchants and slave masters. Yet as the brazen actions of the increasingly arrogant slave 
owning faction of the American ruling class conjured up a cross-class mass movement 
committed to ending the tyranny of the Slave Power, hundreds of thousands industrial 
proletarians would not only help elect the free labor coalition to the federal government but serve 
as a mass base for the armed forces of war abolitionism.   
With their sights set on further consolidating their mastery of the North American 
political economy, the lords of the Cotton Kingdom weaponized their grip on the federal 
government to unleash state violence against the enemies of their class during the last decade 
before the Civil War. As a means of preventing slaves fleeing north on the Underground Railroad 
towards their abolitionist comrades, Southern congressmen and their Northern allies passed the 
Fugitive Slave Act of 1850. Rather than quelling sectional antagonism, the law increased 
violence on the frontline between the people of the free and slave states. Just two years after its 
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passing, Free Soil Congressman Joshua R. Giddings of Ohio asserted that “Civil War may be 
said to exist on the borders of” Pennsylvania.121 Abolitionist leader Wendell Phillips declared 
that Bostonians “must trample this law under our feet.”122 The Fugitive Slave Act was merely 
one provision within the Compromise of 1850 that “brought the South to war with the farmers 
and laborers in the North and West, who wanted free soil but did not want to compete with slave 
labor.”123 The Kansas-Nebraska Bill of 1854, which stripped Congress of their authority to ban 
slavery from the territories, only further exacerbated tensions between the Slave Power and the 
rest of the United States. Kansas devolved into a proxy war between the plantation masters and 
their class enemies. In late May of 1856, proslavery guerrilla forces launched an attack on 
Lawrence, Kansas and burned it to the ground. Future abolitionist martyr John Brown led a 
retaliatory raid on the residents of three dwellings alongside the Pottawatomie Creek. His men 
murdered five supporters of the slave owners’ cause, mutilating them to death with broadswords. 
Frederick Douglass, a personal acquaintance and comrade of Brown, defended the vigilante act 
of class war “wrought by his iron hand.”124 As the slavocracy became increasingly brazen 
throughout the 1850s, the leading intellectual of the black abolitionist vanguard more openly 
embraced revolutionary violence.  
Warfare in Kansas also solidified the emerging broad political coalition opposed to the 
Slave Power, the Republican Party. Primarily rooted in the mass social base of owner-operators, 
it was organized around an ideology of free-labor, perhaps best summarized by President 
Abraham Lincoln in an 1861 address to the House of Representatives: “The prudent, penniless 
beginner in the world labors for wages awhile, saves a surplus with which to buy tools or land 
for himself, then labors on his own account another while, and at length hires another new 
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beginner to help him. This is the just and generous and prosperous system which opens the way 
to all, gives hope to all, and consequent energy and progress and improvement of condition to 
all.”125 For American free laborites the difference between the oppositional social relations of 
production in North American was not the only distinction crucial for their ideological 
development. The higher living standards of the working class in the United States as compared 
to England created a belief in American exceptionalism. English intellectuals such as Charles 
Dickens confirmed their sense of superiority. When juxtaposing the working conditions in 
Lowell and the factories of England, he wrote, “The contrast would be a strong one, for it would 
be between the Good and Evil, the living light and deepest shadow.” As Joshua Freeman notes 
“in the Old World, cotton mills came to be seen as dystopian, in the New World, they were 
repeatedly hailed as beacons of a bright future.”126 While this illusion of peace between labor and 
capital in the United States was exaggerated by those who most profited from the new economic 
developments and would ultimately explode into open violent struggle later in the century, the 
inherent antagonism between the industrial bourgeoisie and the proletariat in the United States 
remained subsumed until the class struggle against the Slave Power reached its conclusion.  
In 1848 at the New York Industrial Congress, a supposedly working class institution 
dominated by middle class reformers, it was declared that, “There is now but one issue. Either 
slavery must have full liberty and sweep to expand itself in infinity or else it must meet in fell 
encounter with death. You cannot touch a single question of general policy in which slavery does 
not get some moral thrust. It cannot be avoided. Slavery must be extinguished.”127 By the 1856 
presidential election, Republicans surged to become the dominant party in the North, empowered 
by their mesmerizing slogan: “Free Soil, Free Speech, Free Men, Frémont!”128 At their national 
!41
convention the Republicans ridiculed the chattel slave relations of production as a “relic of 
barbarism.”129 Ohio governor Salmon P. Chase clearly defined the stakes of the election as a 
struggle over oppositional social systems. He declared that “the issue is boldly made between 
Freedom and Slavery - a Republic and a Despotism! … The chain-gang and Republicanism 
cannot coexist, and you must now elect whether you will vindicate the one at whatever cost, or 
whether you will yield to the other.”130 Republican organizer Francis Blair proclaimed that the 
1856 elections represented more than a partisan contest, “but rather the war of a class - the 
slaveholders - against the laboring people of all classes.”131 Even though the Republican Party 
failed to win the presidency in 1856, the four years leading up to the next election served to 
further antagonize the Northern population against the Slave Power to their eventual political 
benefit. In particular, the Dred Scott decision by the Southern dominated Supreme Court that 
guaranteed the rights of property ownership in human beings even in states where slavery was 
abolished seemed to legitimate fears that chattel slave masters planned to export their peculiar 
form of commodified labor into the free states.  
As the decade came to a close, ideological violence could no longer be contained to the 
periphery of American settler empire. On October 16th, 1859 John Brown and a small number of 
his abolitionist comrades seized the armory at Harpers Ferry in Virginia. Their effort to 
immediately inspire an insurrection of slaves failed spectacularly. Within two days of their raid, 
their uprising against the master class had been crushed. John Brown willingly accepted his fate 
as he was executed before the new year. “I am worth inconceivably more to hang than for any 
other purpose.”132 That statement proved to be far more in touch with reality than his attempt to 
directly incite rebellion. Despite their denial of its potentiality, the specter of slave insurrection 
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haunted the master class, especially in the aftermath of events like the Haitian Revolution and 
Nat Turner’s rebellion. The political climate in which Brown and his comrades launched their 
raid produced an intense reaction from slave owners. South Carolina passed multiple pieces of 
legislation to secure slave property from outside agitators, including an Act to Require and 
Regulate Licenses to Itinerant Salesmen and Traveling Agents. An editorial in an Alabama 
newspaper advocated for the execution of all abolitionists.133 As many prominent Northerners 
celebrated Brown as a martyr, the master class increasingly consolidated around the belief that an 
electoral victory for the Republicans would entail the death of their profitable institution. Their 
class enemies in the free states agreed.      
In the 1860 elections the Republicans dominated the ballot box north of the 41st parallel, 
where Lincoln won more than 60 percent of the vote.134 Abolitionist Wendell Phillips proclaimed 
“Lincoln is in place, Garrison in power.”135 On the day following Lincoln’s victory, Charles 
Francis Adams, son of the aforementioned John Quincy Adams, wrote in his notebook: “The 
great revolution has actually taken place…. The country has once and for all thrown off the 
domination of the Slaveholders.”136 Just prior to his execution, John Brown more accurately 
foresaw the kind of struggle necessary to liquidate the chains of the slave masters. Their power 
“will never be purged but with blood.”137 Many Republicans had actually shared that belief for 
years. Yet their embrace of the notion that the Constitution barred direct interference with 
property ownership in human beings where it already existed has led to many historians to deny 
the Republican Party’s commitment to the destruction of slavery. This narrative overlooks the 
dual strategies developed by antislavery politicians in the last decades prior to the Civil War. If 
their attempt to contain the South’s peculiar institution through peaceful means spurred a violent 
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rebellion of the master class then the Republicans were prepared to legally justify emancipation 
as a military necessity. As early as the 1830s John Quincy Adams had declared that the “power” 
of the national state to free slaves during wartime “is tremendous” and “it is strictly 
constitutional.”138 War abolitionism was not an accident of history but a premeditated 
revolutionary policy developed by those ideologically committed to the liquidation of the Slave 
Power. 
John Brown’s failed attempt to incite a slave revolt at Harpers Ferry followed by the 
electoral victory of the Republican Party affirmed the Southern ruling class’ worst nightmares. 
Slaveholding states quickly moved to break off from the Union. The South Carolinian 
declaration of secession made it clear that their purposes were to protect their peculiar mode of 
capital accumulation from the newly elected Republican Party who they believed were 
committed to the idea that “a war must be waged against slavery until it shall cease throughout 
the United States.”139 The specter of social revolution through war abolitionism induced a reign 
of night terrors for the master class. Jefferson Davis openly feared that an invasion of the South 
would spur a widespread uprising of slaves. In his last speech to the U.S. Senate on January 10, 
1861 he referred to images that captured the brutality unleashed against the French whites by 
revolting slaves during the Haitian Revolution. He pleaded with Northern senators to permit the 
South to peacefully secede to prevent violent class struggle, but it was too late to contain the 
demand for black liberation. News of Lincoln’s election had already spread to the slaves and 
cracked open their political horizons. Louisiana sugar planter Alexander Pugh noted that 
“negroes have got it into their heads they are going to be free of the 4th of March.140 Paranoia 
over the revolutionary implications of Republican victory led the master class to secede from the 
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Union that they had politically dominated since its founding but that they could no longer 
control. As Karl Marx elegantly described in the International Workingmen’s Association’s 
address to President Lincoln, “an oligarchy of 300,000 slaveholders dared to inscribe, for the 
first time in the annals of the world, “slavery” on the banner of armed revolt.”141 
If, as some of the so-called new historians of capitalism argue, the Northern and Southern 
political economies were more alike than different, then why did the slave masters secede from 
the United States and descend the nation into a vicious class struggle in which hundreds of 
thousands died? At the time of the American Civil War, in an article for the Austrian newspaper 
Die Presse, Marx ridiculed English writers who refused to recognize that slavery was the 
fundamental casus belli. “If, therefore, it was indeed only in defense of the Union that the North 
drew the sword, had not the South already declared that the continuance of slavery was no longer 
compatible with the continuance of the Union?”142 While he acknowledges the important work of 
the new historians of capitalism who have effectively demonstrated that the “slave economy was 
often closely connected to the industrial and financial interests of the North and Great Britain,” 
James Oakes correctly asserts that “the fact that they were connected does not mean they were 
the same.”143 However, the crucial distinction between the social relations of production in the 
free and slave states does not inherently lead to the conclusion that the master class was not 
capitalist. Waged work is not necessary for capital accumulation and is not the only form of 
exploited labor that can emerge from stripping producers from their means of production. As 
John Clegg convincingly argues, “violent enslavement of millions of Africans and their progeny 
proved an effective means of commodifying labor in a context in which the violent expropriation 
of native lands gave European settlers a ready alternative to selling their labor. In that context 
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debt and foreclosure became an important mechanism for enforcing capitalist patterns of 
behavior, for it both ensured the liquidity of capital markets, and closed off alternative 
subsistence pathways.”144  
Southern secession was clearly not in opposition to global capitalist development. As 
representatives of the seceded Lower States convened to establish a constitution, they voted to 
reject protectionism. South Carolinian politician Rhett rejoiced that “for the first time in the 
history of the world, the great principle of Free-trade became a part of the fundamental Law of a 
People.” Even those who opposed the amendment did not do so out of animosity towards 
capitalist market relations, but rather because they feared it would be an impediment to 
industrialization.145 What the Confederacy represented was not an attempt to return to a parochial 
past, but an effort by the master class to continually accumulate capital with absolute control 
over commodified labor. Slave owners envisioned a wealthy imperium that spanned the 
hemisphere and would liquidate the social question of bourgeois society through a hegemonic 
ideology of racial solidarity. The Confederacy’s new leadership was explicit about their 
commitment to preserving the racial hierarchy that maintained their dominant position atop the 
social relations of production. Immediately after Alexander Stephens was sworn in as their first 
vice president, he declared that their new government was founded “upon the great truth that the 
negro is not equal to the white man; that slavery subordination to the superior race is his natural 
and normal condition.”146 The master class lacked the forces to wage a violent struggle for the 
defense of their property ownership in human beings entirely on their own. Arno Mayer asserts 
that, “Counterrevolution, which originates with the classes, remains lame and ineffectual unless 
it connects with the anti-revolution, which is a matter of the masses.”147 In order to defeat war 
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abolitionism, the Confederate ruling elite required the support of the far more populous class of 
the impoverished non-slaveholding white landowners.  
The slavocracy needed to convince enough of the Southern yeoman farmers that the free 
labor political coalition was a threat to their way of life and that the perpetuation of black 
bondage was in their interest. Just days after the election of President Lincoln, Alabama 
politician James Phelan declared that the South must prevent “the slow but certain destruction” 
of their peculiar institution by the “Black Republican administration” for “the common cause of 
humanity.”148 In an effort to build popular support for secession Georgia Governor George 
Brown declared that racialized slavery was “the poor man’s best government,” since the “white 
laborer” “belongs to the only true aristocracy, the race of white men.”149 Racial solidarity was the 
means through which the slave masters attempted to suppress class antagonism and construct 
their new political regime founded upon the premise that not all men were created equal. Rather, 
as William Lowndes Yancey proclaimed on the eve of the 1860 election, the fundamental tenet of 
the Confederacy’s national ideology was that the “white race is the citizen, and the master race, 
and the white man is the equal of every other white man.”150 The Southern ruling class utilized 
their press outfits to propagate fears of race war as a means of recruiting the non-slaveholding 
whites to fight for the preservation of their peculiar institution. An Alabama newspaper declared 
that Abraham Lincoln’s ascendency to the presidency “shows that the North [intends] to free the 
negroes and force amalgamation between them and the children of the poor men of the South.”151  
Racism had its intended effect on thousands of poor whites who fought for the Confederacy. 
Landless yeoman like Jim Jeffcoat explained to his family that he’d “rather get killed, than have 
all these niggers freed and claimin’ they’s as good as I is.”152 Only through a regime of explicit 
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white nationalism could the plantation owners transform their conservative ruling class project to 
preserve private property into a counterrevolutionary “elitist movement of the masses, an effort 
to create a new-old regime that, in one way or another, makes privilege popular.”153 While the 
Confederacy would ultimately collapse, its ideological foundation of white nationalist 
imperialism would continually rear its head amidst major crises of bourgeois civilization as the 
most dangerous political weapon wielded by the reactionary faction of private property. 
Ultimately secessionists failed to erase the social question from capitalist society, but 
rather fomented class warfare that ended their reign. As James McPherson convincingly argues 
in The Battle Cry of Freedom, the overzealous actions of the Southern slavocracy planted the 
seeds of their own doom. By launching what he deems a “preemptive counterrevolution” against 
the newly elected Republican Party, the plantation owners directly undermined the labor system 
that empowered their class.154 As the Union Army penetrated deep into the South in order to 
reunify the nation, they dismembered the relations of production that undergirded the 
Confederacy. Thousands of slaves fled the plantations seeking freedom from bondage. In July of 
1861, General Benjamin Butler wrote to the Secretary of War that he was “compelled by this 
reasoning to look upon them as men and women.”155 He refused to return them to their former 
masters who were now in open rebellion against the Union. In a letter to Friedrich Engles in the 
summer of 1862, Karl Marx predicted that in “the end the North will make war seriously, adopt 
revolutionary methods and throw over the domination of the border slave statesmen. A single 
Negro regiment would have a remarkable effect on Southern nerves.”156 By 1862 the dominant 
war emancipationist faction in the federal government had already begun to adopt the more 
radical measures that Marx described and military officials like Butler had already enacted by 
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reacting to the shifting balance of forces on the ground. That September Lincoln announced the 
Emancipation Proclamation.   
During the summer of 1863 the Union Army pierced the Confederacy in the heart of King 
Cotton, shaking the foundations of his throne with a wave of battlefield victories that liberated 
slaves in their wake. By early July the master class had lost control of Vicksburg to their 
enemies. The Union Army seized Port Hudson only five days later. After successful campaigns 
earlier in the war to break the power of the slave owners in Nashville and New Orleans, the 
federal government regained their hold over the strategically crucial Mississippi River.157 
Enslaved blacks approached the Union-held Vicksburg as “the very gate of heaven” that would 
deliver them to the promised land of freedom. Thousands fled from their former masters to the 
army camps that proliferated across the region: 8,550 at Young’s Point, 3,000 near Vicksburg, 
2,800 at Paw Paw Island, 2,400 at the Yazoo River, and more than 1,000 at Goodrich’s Landing. 
Newly liberated blacks celebrated their first Independence Day as they assembled by the levee 
“laughing and rejoicing with inexpressible delight.” Their numbers continued to grow over the 
following months.158 The Union conquering of Vicksburg coincided with the Confederate Army 
being repulsed from Pennsylvania at Gettysburg. Grant wrote to his congressional patron, Illinois 
representative Elisha Washburne, to declare that the master class no longer had a future. “What 
Vice President Stephens acknowledges is the cornerstone of the Confederacy is already knocked 
out. Slavery is dead and cannot be resurrected. It would take a standing army to maintain slavery 
in the South if we were to make peace today, guaranteeing to the South all their former 
constitutional privileges.”159 
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As tens of thousands of slaves were fleeing plantations towards Union lines, “Lincoln 
faced the truth, front forward; and that truth was bit simply that Negroes ought to be free; it was 
that thousands of them were already free, and that either the power which slaves put into the 
hands of the South was to be taken from it, or the North could not win the war.”160 An estimated 
186,017 black troops served in the Union Army, of which nearly 70,000 died. Thousands more 
contributed to the Union cause through their labor and espionage.161 The most critical, yet most 
overlooked, agents in this great liberation struggle, were the slaves who broke their own chains. 
As Senator Charles Sumner later declared, “Without emancipation, followed by the arming of the 
slaves, rebel slavery would not have been overcome.”162 However, that does inherently lead to 
the conclusion, which Chandra Manning argues, that “emancipation began in the intimate details 
of the everyday, in the specific settings to which black men, women, and children ran.”163 While 
her account of the contraband camps provides valuable detail about the process through which 
enslaved black Americans liberated themselves from bondage, it overemphasizes a particular 
moment in a manner that erases the long struggle that led to abolition. Both the enraged master 
class’ reaction to Lincoln’s electoral victory as well as the networks of communications that had 
been built over the decades by black abolitionists had made slaves aware of the political 
ascendency of the free labor coalition. Prior to the special session of the U.S. Congress 
summoned by President Lincoln in July of 1861, plantation mistress Kate Stone noted that 
normally docile “house servants have been giving a lot of trouble lately - lazy and disobedient. 
… I suppose the excitement in the air has infected them.”164 Additionally, Manning’s claim that 
“the idea that the U.S. government would treat with an enslaved person directly as a person and 
not indirectly as the possession of a white property owner simply made no sense” before the war 
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is directly contradicted by the widely held belief among Republicans in emancipation by military 
necessity.165 These revolutionary developments were not unexpected but rather fulfilled the 
antislavery prophecy of war abolitionism. “Whenever our armies march into the Southern 
states,” Republican politician Orville Browning wrote, “the negroes will, of course, flock to our 
standards—They will rise in rebellion, and strike a blow for emancipation from servitude, and to 
avenge the wrongs of ages. This,” he proclaimed, “is inevitable.”166 
Class warfare in the Confederacy was not limited to the struggle between master and 
slave. Secession lacked support in the mountainous enclaves of Arkansas, Tennessee, and 
Virginia as well as other regions like the highlands of the Mississippi River Valley where 
property ownership in human beings was not predominant. Internal divisions within states where 
slavery existed proved crucial in preventing the Border States from joining the Confederacy. 
Elected leaders in the western territory of Virginia broke off from the seceded state and 
proclaimed their allegiance to the Union. A major strategy of the Lincoln administration was to 
intensify antagonism between the subsistence yeoman farmers and the commercial planter class 
in order to highlight the antidemocratic character of the Confederacy.167 Later in his life, Newt 
Knight, who deserted the Confederate Army and established the free state of Jones in 
Mississippi, described his justification for rebelling against the slave owners’ government. His 
county had elected a cooperationist candidate who betrayed his constituents and joined the strong 
majority of delegates who backed secession. “Then next thing we knew,” said Knight, “they 
were conscripting us. The rebels passed a law conscripting everybody between 18 and 35. They 
just came around with a squad of soldiers [and] took you.” He declared that “if they had a right 
to conscript me when I didn’t want to fight the Union, I had a right to quit when I got ready.”168 
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 Not only did soldiers abandon the battlefields as the Union Army penetrated further into 
Confederate territory, but entire communities rebelled against the master class’ state. All across 
the South tensions heightened between the wealthy slave owners and yeoman farmers, even 
sometimes bursting into openly violent conflict. Racial solidarity weakened in the face of mass 
starvation. While the commercial regions dominated by the master class possessed both the slave 
labor and enough land to reorient their local economies towards food-producing activities, poorer 
farmers lacked the resources to make that shift. Too much labor had been lost to the war 
mobilization. The yeomanry could not overcome the crisis with their own limited capacity for 
subsistence production while the Confederate infrastructure was not capable of moving surplus 
grain over the long distances needed to support them. Even though they lacked the transportation 
network to save poorer farmers from debilitating hunger, the greedy behavior of ‘great’ planters 
made the situation worse by setting a terrible example for the medium and smaller-sized 
slaveholders who were in a better position to provide substantial aid to starving yeoman families.
169 In places like Jones County, deteriorating social conditions erupted into a full-scale uprising 
by late 1863.170 Deserters in similar regions across the South armed themselves and formed the 
cutting edge of an organized lower-class movement. While the majority of soldiers who fled the 
frontline would rejoin the Confederate Army when threatened with arrest, more than fifty 
thousand white men from the seceding states waged war for the Union during the struggle 
against the master class.171 In letters written to President Jefferson Davis and Governor Charles 
Clark in 1864, Judge Robert S. Hudson of Leake County denounced the increasingly disloyal 
population in central Mississippi. Hudson urged President Davis to subject anti-Confederate 
“women and noncombatants” to “the most radical and severe treatment.”172 Yet the internal 
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disintegration of the slavocracy and their hold on state power could not be stopped. As Armstead 
L. Robinson argues “a proper epitaph to the failed struggle for Southern independence should 
read instead: Confederate States of America. 1861-1865. Died of Class Conflict.”173 
Earlier in the war as General Grant’s forces surrounded the Confederate Army at Fort 
Donelson, he declared to their leadership that “No terms except unconditional and immediate 
surrender can be accepted.”174 Three years later, the armed forces of the slaveholders' rebellion 
laid down their weapons at Appomattox Court House and went home as paroled prisoners. 
General Lee appeared relieved that the term “unconditional surrender” was absent from the 
proceedings, but in reality what Grant proposed to the rapidly decomposing Confederate military 
was similar to what had occurred after his earlier victories.175 This concept was not a tenant of 
international law, but rather was adapted from commercial law. It entails a surrender of private 
property. By utilizing this legal framework, as Enzo Traverso argues, “the victors wished to show 
that the Confederacy had not only been defeated, but had definitely disappeared - that it did not 
exist anymore.”176 The formulation of “unconditional surrender” would remain outside of the 
confines of violent conflict until the conclusion of the European ideological civil war. Class 
warfare against the Slave Power produced a liquidation of private property without precedent. 
The Southern property owning class experienced widespread bankruptcy. Richard Kilbourne 
asserts that the “apt comparison might be Russia after the 1917 revolution” where “Communists 
simply outlawed private property.”177 
Over a million former slaves who had either liberated themselves by fleeing the 
plantations or gained freedom through legal decrees in the Border States during the war had 
direct federal protection as the war reached its conclusion. Millions more required political 
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action in Washington. An estimated 200,000 enslaved persons died during the struggle to 
overcome the master class that ultimately produced the legislative revolution that permanently 
melted their chains.178 By the end of the year the Thirteenth Amendment was passed and ratified 
by the states, officially banning slavery in the United States. While there was much to be done to 
transform this legal proclamation into a material reality, it was clear to the dying Slave Power 
that their old world would never come back. Upon returning home after years of fighting against 
the Union, a Louisiana planter decried that “Society has been completely changed by the war. 
The [French] revolution of ‘89 did not produce a greater change in the ‘Ancien Regime’ than this 
has in our social life.”179 By 1870 only two representatives from their class that had previously 
held an outsized presence in the federal government still appeared in the United States legislative 
branch.180 
Yet as social revolution unfolded, the forces of private property did not retreat quietly 
into the night, but reconstituted their corporeal form for a new age of class struggle. Just months 
after Lee’s surrender at Appomattox Court House, Marx wrote to Engels that the “reaction has 
already begun in America.”181 As the bourgeoisie squashed the utopian visions of free-labor 
ideology in the North, white supremacist domination would return to the South in the new form 
of sharecropping and legalized segregation. Crucially however, the Southern landowners failed 
to achieve the dominance over black labor that they had pushed for during the war and in its 
aftermath. Abolition democracy from above and working class struggle from below prevented a 
reincarnation of chattel slavery. As WEB Du Bois describes, Radical Republican politicians such 
as Thaddeus Stevens “said that military rule must continue in the South until order was restored, 
democracy established, and the political power built on slavery smashed.”182 In the decade 
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following the Civil War, black workers took advantage of their new right to vote to create 
political circumstances favorable to improving their material conditions. In particular, “through 
establishing public schools and private colleges, and by organizing the Negro church, the Negro 
had acquired enough leadership and knowledge to thwart the worst designs of the new slave 
drivers.”183 Additionally, in places like the South Carolinian Sea Islands where they had an 
overwhelming majority and dominated the local government, former slaves resisted 
proletarianization and struggled for control over their personal means of production. A 
landowner observed that "negroes object so strongly to wages, it is so late and the labor is so 
demoralized that I think almost any sort of contract is better than the risk of losing more time and 
perhaps the labor entirely and coming out minus.”184 
Plans to redistribute land to the recently liberated slaves were ultimately crushed by “the 
settled determination of the planter South to keep the bulk of Negroes as landless laborers.”185 
The armed wing of Southern private property and their sycophants organized into white 
supremacist death squads that unleashed a counterrevolutionary reign of terror upon black labor. 
In only nine counties in South Carolina, the Ku Klux Klan lynched and murdered thirty-five men 
during just a six month period of Reconstruction.186 As the big landholders regained hold over 
state and local governments through this racist cross-class alliance with middle class and poor 
whites, not only were civil rights for blacks restricted but their labor organizing efforts were 
violently suppressed. Whenever workers withheld their labor to improve their living standards, 
they were beaten back into exploitative commodity production. Throughout the 1880s and 1890s 
in South Carolina, the state utilized its militia to liquidate the organizations of black agricultural 
workers. Louisiana sugar workers went on strike in 1887 to secure higher wages. White 
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vigilantes massacred over one hundred of the black laborers in response. Four years later in 
Arkansas, fifteen leaders of a cotton pickers' strike were slaughtered. Nine of them were lynched 
after they had been locked up by the local sheriff.187 
Robert Paxton has argued that the Klan represented “the earliest phenomenon that can be 
functionally related to fascism” since they “constituted an alternate civic authority, parallel to the 
legal state” that undermined a new democratic government they viewed as inherently 
illegitimate.188 The counterrevolution against Reconstruction in the American South built a mass 
base for the rule of private property through the promise of a return to white nationalist glory that 
provided landowners with both a government that restricted the political rights of their racialized 
labor force and an army that violently crushed emerging working class institutions. Leaders of 
the European counterrevolution during the twentieth century civil war drew inspiration not only 
from the efforts that undermined Reconstruction, but proclaimed a shared ideological lineage 
with the Confederacy. While the fascists liquidated organs of working class power and 
dismantled the democratic mechanisms of the Weimar Republic, their new Fuhrer lamented the 
lost opportunity that the American Civil War represented for the forces of reaction. Adolf Hitler 
declared that the “beginnings of a great new social order based on the principle of slavery and 
inequality were destroyed by that war, and with them also the embryo of a future great America 
that would not have been ruled by a corrupt caste of tradesmen, but by a real Herren-class that 
would have swept away all the falsities of liberty and equality.”189 Obviously Hitler’s 
interpretation of history always leaves much to be desired and there were important differences 
between the counterrevolutionary projects of the American and European modern civil wars, but 
it is undeniably significant that the head butcher of the genocidal Nazi Empire considered the 
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Confederacy as a regrettably lost cause of his reactionary mythology. In his magnum opus that 
was published only two years after Hitler’s seizure of power in Germany, Du Bois elegantly 
captured the universal belief that united the particular counterrevolutionary ideologies. “We rule 
by junta; we turn Fascist, because we do not believe in men; yet the basis of fact in this disbelief 
is incredibly narrow. We know perfectly well that most human beings have never had a decent 
human chance to be full men.”190 
To be recognized as fully human, the workers of the world were forced to struggle as the 
liquidation of the slave owning class ultimately empowered the industrial capitalists in the 
United States above all others and therefore unleashed new class antagonisms that remain with 
us to this very day. Sven Beckert describes how Manhattan’s economic elite emerged as the most 
dynamic social class in the world, “making the United States the most bourgeois of all nineteenth 
century societies.”191 Their social and cultural institutions enabled the New York bourgeoisie to 
realize their class consciousness so that they could collectively exert their power to squash the 
rebellion of the Southern slavocracy and then even more thoroughly organize against an 
increasingly unruly proletariat in the aftermath of the Civil War. With his usual flare for the 
dramatic, Marx put this development in starker terms on the last page of Capital Volume I. He 
wrote that “the American Civil War brought in its train a colossal national debt, and, with it, 
pressure of taxes, the rise of the vilest financial aristocracy, the squandering of a huge part of the 
public land on speculative companies for the exploitation of railways, mines, &c., in brief, the 
most rapid centralisation of capital. The great republic has, therefore, ceased to be the promised 
land for emigrant labourers. Capitalistic production advances there with giant strides, even 
though the lowering of wages and the dependence of the wage-worker are yet far from being 
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brought down to the normal European level.”192 The American bourgeoisie would do everything 
in its power to make that happen. As Eric Hobsbawm notes, the “United States, alone among 
states in the bourgeois world, was a country of private justice and private armed forces.”193 In 
fact, the United States has had the bloodiest labor history of industrialization of any nation in the 
imperial core.194 What made the American experience exceptional was that the national 
bourgeoisie in the United States subordinated all other propertied classes far earlier than its 
European counterparts and utilized its firm grip over the state apparatus to wage direct war 
against the working class. 
In the fifty years following the American Civil War, industrial capacity in the United 
States would grow by more than tenfold. Mean productivity growth averaged a 2.8 percent 
increase each year.195 Materially and, as Sven Beckert persuasively argues, “Ideologically, the 
war seemed to complete (and in this sense also end) the revolutionary promises of American 
republicanism while at the same time undermining the social basis for free-labor ideology, as 
well as mercantile stewardship.”196 Less than a decade after the Civil War, a Pittsburgh labor 
weekly acknowledged that “These dreams have not been realized. … The working people of this 
country … suddenly find capital as rigid as an absolute monarchy.”197 Waged labor during the 
process of rapid industrialization in the United States transformed into a nightmare for American 
laborers. From 1880 to 1900 a total of 35,000 workers were killed on the job.198 Eric Foner 
explains how the “dichotomy between slave and free labor masked the fact that ‘free labor’ itself 
referred to two distinct economic conditions—the wage laborer seeking employment in the 
marketplace, and the property-owning small producer enjoying a modicum of economic 
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independence.”199 The commonality between these melted into air with the liquidation of the 
master class and the ascendance of industrial capitalism.  
Karl Marx declared that in “the United States of North America, every independent 
movement of the workers was paralysed so long as slavery disfigured a part of the Republic. 
Labour cannot emancipate itself in the white skin where in the black it is branded. But out of the 
death of slavery a new life at once arose. The first fruit of the Civil War was the eight hours’ 
agitation, that ran with the seven-leagued boots of the locomotive from the Atlantic to the 
Pacific, from New England to California.”200 Even though the full emancipation of labor that 
Marx anticipated has yet to come to pass, a new phase of class struggle did indeed arise in the 
United States following the America Civil War. A radical Massachusetts clergyman drew on the 
earlier legacy of the American Revolution amidst this new balance of forces and proclaimed that 
the 1877 railroad strikers were "the lineal descendants of Samuel Adams, John Hancock, and the 
Massachusetts yeomen who began so great a disturbance a hundred years ago . . . only now the 
kings are money kings and then they were political kings."201 Through Marx’s engagement with 
the American Civil War emerged a central tenet of his revolutionary socialist philosophy. As 
opposed to German socialists like Ferdinand Lassalle, Marx rejected the notion that all classes 
but the proletariat were inherently reactionary.202 He argued instead that struggles lead by 
colonized, hyper-exploited populations against non-bourgeois ruling classes were a necessary 
prerequisite for the liberation of all the workers of the world. A century later the successful 
revolutionary struggles waged by Marxist organizations had occurred not in the industrially 
advanced imperial core, but in countries with primarily agriculturally based economies where the 
political institutions were dominated by foreign capitalists and the national landowning classes. 
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Yet the seizures of national states by socialist revolutionaries proved to be far from a death blow 
to the international ruling class, but rather the opening salvo in an increasingly intense political 
struggle. What the Civil War in the United States and its aftermath most significantly 
demonstrate is that the real story of modernity is a continuously violent struggle over 
egalitarianism between the forces of revolution and counterrevolution, colored by the historical 
racialization of property ownership, unleashed by the permanent revolution of capital 
accumulation.  
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